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Despite the occasional willingness of Louisiana courts to hear
such matters, the political question doctrine nonetheless might have
provided the supreme court with a more appropriate means of dis-
tinguishing League of Women Voters from prior taxpayer standing
cases, particularly Bussie. Ordering the Tax Commission to equalize
tax assessments, while giving them two years to comply with the legis-
lative mandate," is not as politically volatile an action as compelling
the City Council of New Orleans, a board of elected officials, to vote
for an increase in taxes. From this perspective, the court was
justified in not hearing the matter, for in the background lurked the
problem of how the court would enforce its order should the City
Council refuse to vote for a tax increase.
Although these factors may have justified a refusal to entertain
the matter, the court could have avoided further confusion in the
already inconsistent line of jurisprudence regarding taxpayer stand-
ing had the court disposed of the case by utilizing the political ques-
tion doctrine.
Eve Barrie Masinter
THE DECLINE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATE:
Stryckers'Bay-A MODERN WEST SIDE STORY
In October 1971, the Trinity Episcopal School Corporation (Trin-
ity) sued in federal district court to enjoin the New York City Plan-
ning Commission (the Commission) and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) from constructing low-income hous-
ing at a site on Manhattan's upper west side.' Trinity, which had
If the Senate failed to observe its own rules when it created the committee which
reported this bill, that fact cannot affect the validity of the act because it is well
settled that an act of the Legislature will not be declared void or invalid for
failure of the legislative body to observe its own rules of procedure. Such rules
are usually formulated or adopted by the legislative body itself, and the obser-
vance of these rules is a matter entirely within its control and discretion and is
not subject to review by the courts as long as the legislative action does not
violate some constitutional provision.
See Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana's
"Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187 (1981).
53. 286 So. 2d at 706.
1. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In 1969 the Commission, acting in conjunction with HUD, modified implementation of
an urban renewal plan on the upper west side of Manhattan after substantial progress
toward the plan's completion. Trinity, which had premised its investment in the pro-
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participated in the urban renewal plan of which the proposed hous-
ing was part, was denied injunctive relief by the court for the
Southern District of New York.2 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed all but the lower court's treatment of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) claim and remanded the
case, requiring HUD to study possible alternatives to the proposed
plan.' On remand, the district court reaffirmed its original decision
as to the validity of the agency action.' On a second appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit vacated and remanded again, stating that, under
NEPA, administrative delay could not become an overriding factor
in HUD's determination.' The Supreme Court reversed and held that
an agency's mandate, under NEPA, is not substantive, but is essen-
tially procedural; once the court finds that procedural requirements
have been met and the environmental consequences of agency action
considered, the courts can do no more. Stryckers'Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S.Ct. 497 (1980).
The core concepts of NEPA are found in two statutes. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331 (a)' recognizes "the profound impact of man's activity on ...
ject on the original plan, sued to enjoin the changes, which would have replaced plan-
ned middle-income housing units with the low-income units of a seventeen-story
highrise.
2. Id. Trinity had participated in the plan by building a school and housing
development at a nearby location. The court found that the changes would not
endanger the plan's objectives of racial and economic integration and held that HUD
did not violate NEPA in failing to prepare an environmental impact statement.
3. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
4. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
5. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976):
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the pro-
found influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expan-
sion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and
recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environ-
mental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is
the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and
local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use
all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in
a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the contin-
uing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coor-
dinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may -
(1) fulfilf the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
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all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technolo-
gical advances .. ."' The statute states that its goals, among others,
are the maintenance "of the environment for succeeding genera-
tions," the assurance of safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
pleasing surroundings,9 and the attainment of "the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation.""0 The
statute mandates further that the "Federal Government . . . use all
practical means, consistent with other essential considerations of na-
tional policy"'" to attain these objectives. Section 4331 concludes
with the recognition that "each person should enjoy a healthful
environment,"1 and that each person has a corresponding respon-
sibility to preserve and enhance the environment.'
The goals of NEPA are stated by section 4331, and section 433214
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preser-
vation and enhancement of the environment.
7. Id. at (a).
8. Id. at (b)(1).
9. Id. at (b)(2).
10. Id. at (b)(3).
11. Id. at (b).
12. Id. at (c).
13. Id
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976):
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1)
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values




(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall con-
sult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal,
State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environ-
mental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and
shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D) Any detailed statement required under subparagraph (C) after January 1,
1970, for any major Federal action funded under a program of grants to States
shall not be deemed to be legally insufficient solely by reason of having been
prepared by a State agency or official, if:
(i) the State agency of official has statewide jurisdiction and has the
responsibility for such action,
(ii) the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and participates in
such preparation,
(iii) the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such state-
ment prior to its approval and adoption, and
(iv) after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official provides early
notification to, and solicits the views of, any other State.or any Federal
land management entity of any action or any alternative thereto which
may have significant impacts upon such State or affected Federal land
management entity and, if there is any disagreement on such impacts,
prepares a written assessment of such impacts and views for incorpora-
tion into such detailed statement.
The procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official of his
responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire statement or
of any other responsibility under this chapter; and further, this subparagraph
does not affect the legal sufficiency of statements prepared by State agencies
with less than statewide jurisdiction.
(E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources;
(F) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental prob-
lems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to max-
imize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the
quality of mankind's world environment;
(G) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and indivi-
duals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the
quality of the environment;
(H) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development
of resource-oriented projects; and
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directs implementation "to the fullest extent possible '"'5 through the
utilization of an "interdisciplinary approach"" and methods designed
to insure that "unquantified environmental . . .values .. .be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic
and technical considerations."'7 Section 4332 directs that federal
agencies prepare and publish detailed environmental impact state-
ments (EIS) analyzing the consequences of and alternatives to fed-
eral actions which significantly affect the human environment.'8
Furthermore, section 4332 requires that federal agencies develop
alternatives to proposed federal projects 9 and "utilize ecological
information in the planning ... of resource-oriented projects.""0 It is
significant to note that section 4332 employs mandatory language in
articulating this multifaceted directive.2'
Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commission22 is an oft-cited and scholarly exposition of the proposi-
tion that, in enacting NEPA, Congress imposed upon federal agen-
cies substantive duties.23 In that decision the federal appellate court
of the District of Columbia held that an agency's task under NEPA
is analytic, discretionary, and involves a high- degree of careful con-
sideration-in short, that "consideration of environmental matters
must be more than a pro forma ritual.""
(I) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II
of this chapter.
15. Id.
16. Id. at (2)(A).
17. Id. at (2)(B).
18. Id. at (2)(C).
19. Id. at (2)(E).
20. Id. at (2)(H).
21. Id. at (2). The statute employs the word shall.
22. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. This is to be distinguished from the discrete issue of whether NEPA grants
substantive rights. Courts generally have held that NEPA does not. Bradford
Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972); Mc-
Queary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Morris
v. TVA, 345 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp.
573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp.
222 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of
United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Contra, Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972). For an excellent discussion of the issue of state and federal constitutional
guarantees of environmental rights, see Kemmis, Environmental Rights, 39 MONT. L.
REV. 224 (1978).
24. 449 F.2d at 1128. The court further held that administrative rules formulated
by the Atomic Energy Commission precluding review of nonradiological environmental
impacts unless specifically raised, or when these issues have been passed on by other
agencies, and precluding such consideration between the grant of the construction
[Vol. 411358
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In elucidating the analytic function which the court understood
NEPA to demand of federal agencies, the court stated the "NEPA
mandates a rather finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing analysis
in each instance."' The court stated that the act compels "a case-by-
case examination and balancing of discrete factors."" If an adminis-
trative decision is reached without "individualized consideration and
balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good
faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse."" The court
concluded that "NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and
informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable
duties."'
The decision in Calvert Cliffs' is perhaps most significant for its
suggestion that under NEPA the final administrative decision must
bear a rational relationship to the assimilation and analysis of
diverse environmental factors." The court reasoned that "[t]he point
of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that . . . the
optimally beneficial action is finally taken."3
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. The Corps of Engineers
of United States Army," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the district court's holding that NEPA was a
merely procedural enactment.2 The court adopted the view that
NEPA imposed upon federal agencies supra-procedural analytic
functions.3 The court recognized the requirements of NEPA as "sub-
stantive" 4 and stated that these requirements could be satisfied not
by mechanical adherence to procedural requirements but through a
"careful and informed decisionmaking process." 5 In concluding that
permit and the decision to grant an operating license to a nuclear plant represented a
"crabbed interpretation" which made a "mockery" of NEPA's mandate to federal agen-
cies to give serious considerations to environmental issues. Id. at 1117.
25. Id. at 1113.
26. Id. at 1122.
27. Id. at 1115.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1117. As the court stated, "What possible purpose could there be in
requiring the 'detailed statement' to be before hearing boards, if the boards are free to
ignore entirely the contents of the statement? NEPA was meant to do more than regu-
late the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy." Id.
30. Id. at 1123.
31. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
32. Id. at 297.
33. Id. at 298. As the court succinctly asserted, "The unequivocal intent of NEPA
is to require agencies to consider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth
in the Act, not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill governmental
archives." Id.
34. Federal agencies, stated the court, have an "obligation to carry out the




NEPA is substantive in principle, the court relied heavily on the
notion that section 4331 is a statement of federal goalsM0 and that the
"procedures included in [42 U.S.C. § 4332] of NEPA are not ends in
themselves" but are means to achieving these federal objectives and
were "intended . . . [as] . . . 'action forcing.''3 7
In his concurring opinion to National Helium Corp. v. Morton,8
Judge Breitenstein acknowledged that NEPA had done more than
alter administrative procedures and had transformed the substance
of the deliberative administrative function. Judge Breitenstein
stated that "NEPA alters the decisionmaking process of the federal
agencies and brings environmental factors to an equal footing with
economic, technical, and other traditional considerations, all of which
must be balanced by the decision-maker." 9 National Helium Corp. is
also important for indicating that substantive agency action taken
pursuant to NEPA must reflect the prior analysis of environmental
factors.40
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Corps of Engineers of
United States Army," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
in dicta the essential relationship between the weighing processes
mandated by NEPA and the final substantive decision rendered by
the administrative agency, stating that it is "obviously preferable
that environmental studies and their evaluation occur before the
agency becomes committed to a project." 2 Rejecting a strictly proce-
dural and mechanistic view of NEPA's mandate, the court stated
that "NEPA commands 'full good faith consideration of the environ-
ment, not formalistic paper shuffling between agency desks.'"'
36. Id. at 297.
37. Id. at 298. The court also relied on Senator Henry Jackson's statement that
"If an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric ... each of these agencies
must be enabled and directed to participate in active and objective-oriented environ-
mental management. Concern for environmental quality must be made part of every
phase of Federal action." Id. at n.13.
38. 486 F.2d at 1005 (10th Cir. 1973) (Breitenstein, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1005-06.
40. Id. at 1006. In implicitly rejecting a procedural model of NEPA's mandate,
Judge Breitenstein recognized that the consideration of environmental factors ulti-
mately must be reflected in any substantive action taken by the agency. Judge
Breitenstein concurred in the majority's refusal to enjoin the Secretary of the
Interior's cancellation of helium contracts since the Secretary's "action was not a
mechanical compliance with NEPA but rather a full consideration of [the environmen-
tal impact statement] with an understanding and reasonable application of its compre-
hensive study. He balanced the environmental factors with the other pertinent factors.
His final action was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion." Id.
(emphasis added).
41. 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 1129.
43. Id. The court also stated that at the heart of the question of whether the
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One of the more explicit recognitions that NEPA imposes upon
federal agencies analytic, supra-procedural duties was contained as
dicta in Shiffier v. Schlesinger," wherein the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that Congress has imposed in section 4331 "a sub-
stantive obligation ... to balance the environmental considerations
and goals of the Congress along with the traditional factors ....
Thus, before undertaking any [project], the agency must determine
whether its benefit is outweighed by negative environmental impli-
cations requiring modifications to, or abandonment of the proposed
action."45
There also have been indications from the Supreme Court that
NEPA was designed to make an impact on substantive decisionmak-
ing. In his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Federal Power Com-
responsible federal agency had prejudged the problems presented it, contrary to the
intent of NEPA, was the issue of whether "the Corps [had] acted perfunctorily in its
compliance efforts." Id.
44. 548 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 100 (emphasis added). Other decisions rejecting the view that NEPA
imposes solely procedural duties include the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision
that stated in dicta that when construction proceeds before environmental analysis,
such "chronology ... is far from that ordained by the letter and the spirit" of NEPA.
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1972). In recognizing the vital rela-
tionship between the mandated consideration of environmental factors and the
substantive administrative decision to approve or abandon an industrial project, as
well as the proposition that NEPA has transformed federal agencies' substantive
decision-making duties, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated further that:
The concept of that Act was that responsible officials would think about environ-
ment before a significant project was launched; that what would be assessed was
a proposed action, not a fait accompli; that alternatives to such action would be
seriously canvassed and assayed .... The executive branch guidelines [published
by the Council on Environmental Quality] made even more clear that the purpose
of the statute was to build into the agency decisions process environmental consi-
derations ...
Id. (emphasis added).
Several other federal decisions have adopted the view that NEPA requires not
merely pro forna adherence to procedural requirements, but that substantive adminis-
trative decisions be informed by and reflect the analysis of environmental factors. In
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973), the First Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court decision to dissolve an injunction against a housing develop-
ment in which HUD participated, when HUD's drainage proposal did not appear
reasonable or adequately explained, given the extant data. In Monroe County Conser-
vation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that the primary purpose of the environmental impact statement and
the analysis therein "is to compel federal agencies to give serious weight to environ-
mental factors in making discretionary choices." Id. at 697 (emphasis added). And in
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d
Cir. 1971), Judge Oakes, dissenting against a second circuit decision denying relief to
those seeking to enjoin a hydroelectric project, stated that the project's proponents
(the FPC) had violated NEPA because their final decision to proceed did not reflect
the careful consideration of "relevant factors." 453 F.2d at 485 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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mission, Justice Douglas stated that NEPA's mandate "was aimed
partly at eliminating the excuse which had often been offered by
bureaucrats that their statutory authority did not authorize con-
sideration of [environmental] factors in their policy decisions.""'
Similarly, it was stated in New York v. Kleppe that "the essential
requirement of the NEPA is that before an agency takes major action,
it must have taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences... 7
It is against this backdrop, analytic and jurisprudential, that
courts have delineated a narrower, more restricted, and procedural
model of federal administrative responsibility under NEPA. In
Citizens Airport Committee of Chesterfield County v. Volpe,48 the
federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia held, in denying an
injunction against the construction of an airport, that the Secretary
of Transportation need not take "affirmative substantive steps" to
resolve environmental problems. 9 Outlining a statutory mandate
that fell short of requiring that substantive administrative decisions
rationally reflect an analysis of environmental factors, the court
stated that "NEPA does no more than require federal agencies to
consider environmental effects in certain federal projects and to file
a statement concerning these effects .... The act provides no sub-
stantive conditions that must be met before a federal project may
be approved." 0 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers of United States Army,5 1 the district court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas held, in adopting a procedural view of
NEPA's mandate, that while citizens' groups could demand that
federal agencies cogently analyze environmental factors, these
groups had no vested right to demand an administrative decision
that would secure "the type of environment envisioned" by NEPA
as an administrative objective.2 Ultimately, said the court, the final
administrative decision, notwithstanding the requirements of NEPA,
was within the executive prerogative of the responsible agency."
Rejecting the contention that NEPA creates substantive rights, the
court stated that "plaintiffs are relegated to the 'procedural'
requirements of the Act."4 In Conservation Council of North
Carolina v. Froehlke,55 the court for the Middle District of North
46. 407 U.S. 926, 927 (1972).
47. 429 U.S. 1307, 1311 (1976).
48. 351 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va. 1972).
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id.
51. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
52. Id. at 755.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
1362 [Vol. 41
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Carolina held that when an agency has compiled an environmental
impact statement which fully discloses all possible environmental
effects, the agency has discharged its statutory responsibility under
NEPAl-even when expert testimony suggested strongly that the
agency's final decision did not incorporate judiciously the analysis
contained in the environmental impact statement. 7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also implicitly rejected a
substantive model of NEPA's mandate and the notion that NEPA
demands ecologically balanced administrative decisions, stating that
NEPA's provisions "pertain to procedure and do not undertake to
control decision making .... 1
Decisions espousing a substantive view of NEPA's mandate have
not been overruled expressly en masse. However, the prevalent
view, as represented by recent Supreme Court decisions, is that
NEPA's mandate is essentially procedural and that once the discrete
procedures have been fulfilled there is no requirement that ultimate
administrative decisions bear a rational relationship to the precedent
analysis. Thus, in Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings (S. C.R.A.P.),59 the
Supreme Court, repudiating more substantive views of NEPA's
mandate, implicitly rejected the criticisms of dissenting Justice
Douglas" and of the lower court.81 The district court had found that
the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) analysis of environ-
mental factors constituted merely pro forma compliance with NEPA,
that the agency did not in good faith analytically balance environ-
mental factors, and that the agency's final substantive decision did
not respond to cogent criticisms of other federal agencies."2 In dis-
sent, Justice Douglas found that the agency's final decision and sup-
porting analysis had been thoroughly discredited by other agencies"
and asserted that "NEPA is more than a technical statute of ad-
ministrative procedure."" However, the majority opinion empha-
56. Id. at 226.
57. Id.
58. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added).
59. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
60. 422 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974). The lower court and Justice Douglas asserted
in essence that the Interstate Commerce Commission had violated NEPA with a deci-
sion not to declare unlawful a railroad freight increase; the increase allegedly would
have exacerbated the effect of a preexistent price discrimination against the transport
of recyclable metals, thereby discouraging the use of such recyclables.
62. Id. at 1301-02.
63. 422 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 331.
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sized NEPA's mandate as procedural" and did not focus upon
whether the final substantive decision was based upon, or reflected,
careful, good faith analysis, but instead stressed the fact that the
ICC's published analysis complied with NEPA's technical require-
ments of timing and scope." To similar effect is the recent Supreme
Court decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,"1 wherein the Court stated that
while "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the
Nation . . . its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.""'
Decisions describing the scope of judicial review of administra-
tive acts made pursuant to NEPA and the interaction of the judi-
ciary and administrative agencies in achieving NEPA's mandates
have largely determined NEPA's process and reality. Judicial
review of agency action taken pursuant to NEPA is generally
recognized to be governed by the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)." However, there has been a variance in judi-
cial approach in applying the review provisions of the APA to
administrative actions taken pursuant to NEPA. Several decisions
have espoused a substantive model of review in which the courts
themselves engage in an analytic inquiry to ensure that environ-
mental factors have been given good faith consideration and that the
substantive administrative decision on the merits reflects the consi-
deration of such factors." Nevertheless, the majority of the courts
have viewed their review function as an extremely limited one. 1
65. Id. at 319.
66. Id. at 320-28.
67. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
68. Id. at 558.
69. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States
Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Jackson County, Missouri v. Jones, United States Air Force, 571 F.2d 1004,
1013 (8th Cir. 1978); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 951-53, (7th Cir. 1973); Con-
servative Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 484-85 (2d
Cir. 1971) (Oakes, J., dissenting); Environmental Defense Fund v. Engineers of United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1972); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359
F. Supp. 404, 410-11 (W.D. Va. 1973).
71. See generally Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338
(W.D. Mo. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972); Conserva-
tion Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972). Courts
must determine whether the agency discharged the essentially procedural tasks of con-
sidering the impacts of a project proposal and its alternatives and of compiling an EIS.
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1977); Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 344 F.
Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (setting aside, under the APA action that is taken without
such "observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(D) (1976)). In
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." appears to
have established a narrower, more procedural model of judicial
review under NEPA and the APA with its pronouncement that
[clourts are to play only a limited role.... It is to insure a fully
informed and well considered decision, not necessarily a decision
the judges . . . would have reached . . . . Administrative deci-
sions should be set aside . . . only for substantial procedural or
substantive reasons as mandated by statute, . . . not simply
because the court is unhappy with the result reached."
The approach taken by the Stryckers' Bay Court to the proce-
dural/substantive duty question was that an agency's duties, under
NEPA, are essentially procedural. The Stryckers' Bay Court found
that HUD, which had compiled data on the project's probable impacts
and had published an analysis of its costs and benefits after the ini-
tial determination to proceed, had thereby "considered" the
project's environmental consequences, and discharged NEPA's
essentially procedural requirements. The Court refrained from ana-
lyzing whether the responsible federal agency had resolved the con-
flict according to NEPA's decisional criteria, holding that courts
cannot interject themselves into the sphere of agency discretion.
Once an agency has considered a project's environmental conse-
quences and performed NEPA's procedural tasks, the courts can
require no more.74
The administrative consideration of environmental factors which
the Stryckers' Bay Court adjudged to be legally adequate consisted
Citizens Against the Destruction of Napa v. Lynn, 391 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
the court explicitly recognized that 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(D) of the APA is the provision
governing the judicial review of administrative agencies' compliance with the pro-
cedural requirements of NEPA. The courts generally have refrained from analyzing
the wisdom of substantive administrative decisions, or the costs and benefits of a par-
ticular proposal, and will not substitute judicial discretion for that of the agency.
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1977); Daly v. Volpe,
514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Evans v. Train, 460 F. Supp. 237 (S.D. Ohio 1978);
Burleigh v. Calloway, 362 F. Supp. 121 (D. Hawaii 1973); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345
F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C.
1971). Courts limit themselves, instead, to reviewing and overturning, in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), substantive decisions and impact analyses that are arbitrary
or capricious. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1977);
Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975). In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), the court explicitly recognized that this stan-
dard of review emanates from 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A).
72. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
73. Id. at 558.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 499-500.
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of HUD's formulation and publication of a written analysis of the
project's impacts and alternatives. 5 However, the Court, insofar as
it stopped short of requiring that this consideration of environmen-
tal factors be integrated into the ultimate decisional process, impli-
citly rejected the assertion of the appellate court that "'considera-
tion' is not an end in itself," but a means to the end of a prudent
decision." It appears that the court has sanctioned a model of admin-
istrative compliance with NEPA in which the consideration of envi-
ronmental factors is isolated from the final substantive exercise of
agency discretion.
The Supreme Court in Stryckers' Bay did not disturb the
agency's apparently mechanistic conception of NEPA's mandate.
Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of HUD's treatment of the con-
troversy was its formulation of the initial plan to proceed prior to a
thorough analysis of the project's impacts and alternatives.7 Indeed,
such an analysis was conducted only at the behest of the appellate
court. 8 Upon a second review of HUD's compliance efforts, the
appellate court again rejected them, because of the court's belief
that HUD's analysis had been done as a perfunctory gesture, with
no genuine intent to implement its logic. 9 Implicit in the Supreme
Court's reversal of the appellate court's reasoning, and in the ratifi-
cation of HUD's compliance efforts, is a repudiation of Environmen-
tal Defense Fund's chronology -thought before decision and ac-
tion'°-and Sierra Club v. Morton's underlying theme: the purpose
of the environmental analysis of the EIS is to inform and guide
federal proposals-not merely to justify them."
By ratifying this mode of administrative action, the Court
appears to have effectively ignored the criticisms of courts that
have insisted that the consideration of environmental factors under
NEPA must be construed as an analytic function that is part of the
ultimate decisional process-and not merely a clerical, paper-
shuffling task in which agency departments exchange detailed analy-
75. Id. at 499.
76. 590 F.2d at 44.
77. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, the analysis of alter-
natives conducted by HUD prior to its decision to proceed "was either highly limited
or non-existent." 523 F.2d at 94.
78. Id. at 95.
79. As Justice Marshall noted in concurring with the appellate court, HUD itself
conceded that its proposal raised serious sociological questions and that better alter-
natives existed from "'the standpoint of social environmental impact.'" 100 S. Ct. at
501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. See text at note 42, supra.
81. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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ses which the agency is free to ignore in formulating its final deci-
sion.82 As one court has inquired, "[w]hat possible purpose could
there be in requiring the 'detailed statement' to be before hearing
boards, if the boards are free to ignore entirely the contents of the
statement?"" The principal concern of these courts appears, in
retrospect, to be that the consideration of environmental factors
becomes a meaningless and perfunctory task unless undertaken with
the intention to evaluate seriously a project's impacts and the
possibility of its modification or abandonment. In holding that a
court can only require of agencies that they at some point engage in
a consideration of environmental factors, the Court has held, effect-
ively, that once an agency has conducted this analysis, the agency is
free to discard the analysis when formulating a plan of action. Thus,
in the instant case, despite administrative findings that the long-
range impacts of the housing project would be predictably and cri-
tically damaging to the urban environment and the fabric of urban
life," and despite administrative findings that alternative sites would
have been ecologically preferable," the Court did not disturb or
question agency action that disregarded these substantive concerns
and which was based instead on the consideration of administrative
delay. The agency involved was allowed to "bootstrap," ultimately
achieving administrative objectives through its own initial lethargy
in analyzing alternative proposals. Although HUD itself recognized
that better sites existed for the low-income housing,87 HUD's failure
to identify these sites in the initial planning stages created a situa-
tion wherein a substantial delay would accompany any attempt to
relocate the housing at alternative sites; thus, delay became the
dispositive factor in HUD's decision to construct the housing at the
initial site.
The Stryckers' Bay Court stated that procedural consideration
itself was the essence of an agency's statutory function under
NEPA.88 In so doing the Court repudiated the decisions articulating
the link between procedural consideration of environmental factors
and NEPA's admittedly substantive goals. The Stryckers' Bay per
curiam decision held that an agency has discharged its statutory
duty under NEPA once it has "considered" environmental factors. 9
82. See note 43, supra.
83. See note 29, supra.
84. Justice Marshall's incisive dissent included a discussion of HUD's analysis. 100
S. Ct. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. 100 S. Ct. at 499-500.
87. Id. at 501.




The court did not require that the consideration of environmental
factors be incorporated into the decisional process. The salient theme
of several decisions to which the Supreme Court was thereby unfaith-
ful is that agencies must not only consider environmental factors,
but must integrate such consideration into the ultimate decisional
process." As was stated in National Helium Corporation, NEPA did
not merely alter agency procedures, but also transformed adminis-
trative agencies' substantive, deliberative functions.'
Implicit in the integration of environmental considerations into
the decisional process is the notion that the ultimate decision
reached will reflect a rational evaluation of federal proposals accord-
ing to NEPA's decisional criteria. However, in Stryckers' Bay the
Court stated that NEPA required only that agencies consider envi-
ronmental factors. The Court's formulation implies that NEPA does
not require that agency action rationally reflect a consideration of
environmental concerns. The holding apparently repudiates the
holding in National Helium Corp. that final agency action under
NEPA is to rationally reflect the precedent analysis of environmen-
tal factors92 and the holding in Sierra Club v. Morton, that agency
action is to be guided by the analysis contained in the EIS.11 The
holding in Stryckers' Bay also critically undermines the holding in
Calvert Cliffs' that NEPA mandates that the consideration of envi-
ronmental factors is not isolated from decisionmaking, but is rather
a careful balancing of a proposal's costs and benefits which is designed
to ensure that the most beneficial action is finally taken."
It is worthwhile to note, in this context, that 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(2)(B)" appears to adopt the view that the consideration of environ-
mental factors is not merely an isolated, procedural process that can
be disregarded in the substantive formulation of administrative pro-
posals. This subsection mandates that federal agencies develop
methods "which will insure that ...environmental . . .values may
be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with
economic and technical considerations."" The Court in Stryckers'
Bay, by requiring HUD only to consider environmental values
without also requiring that this consideration be incorporated into
90. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir.
1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.C. 1971).
91. See text at note 39, supra.
92. See note 40, supra.
93. See text at note 81, supra.
94. See text at note 30, supra.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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the final decisional calculus, has arguably circumvented the applica-
tion of NEPA's clear statutory mandate.
An integral component of the holding in Stryckers' Bay is the
limited concept of judicial review therein espoused, a notion closely
related to the Court's concept of administrative function under
NEPA. Corresponding to the theory that NEPA imposes an essen-
tially procedural mandate is the view that the appropriate role
of judicial review is limited to ascertaining that agencies have per-
formed procedural tasks. Similarly, there is a logical relationship
between the view that NEPA affects the substantive and analytic
processes of agencies and the view that courts are legally compelled
to evaluate federal administrative proposals to insure that agencies
rationally assess their own projects according to NEPA's criteria.
In Stryckers' Bay, the Court pointedly refrained from analyzing
either HUD's' housing proposals or the issue of whether HUD had
resolved the conflict according to NEPA's criteria. The Court
perceived the judicial duty to be an extremely limited one: to ensure
that the responsible federal agency had complied with NEPA's pro-
cedural requirements and had considered a project's environmental
consequences." Insofar as the Court did not adopt a substantive
model of NEPA's mandate, it was only logical that judicial enforce-
ment of NEPA did not include ascertainment of whether federal
agencies had exercised their discretion rationally: this issue would
not arise within the scope of NEPA's allegedly procedural commands.
However, the Court's notion of judicial review contradicts the deci-
sions which assert that the courts themselves must engage in a sub-
stantive, analytic inquiry to ensure that agencies have not only eva-
luated environmental considerations but have incorporated them
into the decisional process." The underlying theme of those deci-
sions, to which the Court in Stryckers'Bay was impervious, is that
judicial analysis is necessary to ensure that the consideration of
environmental concerns will not be devoid of meaning but will be
evident and reflected in agency decisions and proposals.
Stryckers' Bay raises the question of NEPA's ultimate impact. At
the root of that question is the issue of whether NEPA requires of
agencies an exercise of substantive discretion," or an exercise of
duties that are mechanical and "essentially procedural."'1 Under the
former model, NEPA influences the agency's substantive decision-
97. 100 S. Ct. at 500.
98. See note 71, supra.
99. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
100. 100 S. Ct. at 500.
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making process, ensuring that any ultimate agency action will be
guided by environmental concerns; under the latter model, consider-
ation of environmental factors is merely another of many discrete
administrative procedures that need not be integrated into substan-
tive decisionmaking and which need not influence ultimate agency
action. The Stryckers' Bay Court required not that agency action
rationally reflect the agency's consideration of environmental factors
and alternative proposals, but merely that the agency at some time
engage in environmental analysis.10'
Of equal importance to the Court's definition of administrative
function under NEPA is the nature of judicial review employed in
Stryckers'Bay. The appellate court noted that HUD's analysis indi-
cated that more rational alternatives existed than the one ultimately
chosen. 2 HUD itself recognized the negative impact on the urban
environment of the proposal's concentration of low-income families
in an already crowded area."3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
foreclosed substantial inquiry into the wisdom of HUD's decision
and into the issue of whether HUD's final action rationally reflected
a consideration of NEPA's ecological concerns. As dissenting Justice
Marshall noted, "[vlalid questions arise from the fact that 68% of all
public housing units would be sited on only one crosstown axis in
this area of New York City .... [T]he resulting high concentration of
low-income housing would hardly further racial and economic inte-
gration." "04
The inherent flaw of the Court's approach is that it paves the
way for improvident resource commitments in the future and ren-
ders the courts powerless to intervene when agency analysis logi-
cally establishes the superiority of one proposal, but the agency
nevertheless chooses to implement another. Stryckers' Bay stands
for the proposition that courts can require no more than that the
agencies consider environmental factors. However, it is difficult to
perceive the significance of considering environmental factors if this
consideration is not rationally reflected in the agency's ultimate
decisions. The evaluation of federal proposals according to NEPA's
statutory criteria is insignificant unless integrated into the decision-
making process; resource determinations will often be imprudent if
the courts remain powerless to demand that agency decisions reflect,
and are the analytic products of, reasoned analysis. Translating envi-
ronmental factors into vital components of the decisionmaking pro-
101. Id.





cess may be the greatest hope for achieving the intent of NEPA,
which was not merely designed to superimpose procedures on agen-
cies, but to achieve sound environmental planning and a healthy
environment through intense administrative consideration of envi-
ronmental concerns."'5 As was succinctly stated by Justice Marshall
in a dissenting opinion, "I do not subscribe to the Court's apparent
suggestion that [reviewing courts are limited] to the essentially
mindless task of determining whether an agency 'considered' envi-
ronmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided
to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. . . .Our cases
establish that the arbitrary or capricious standard prescribes a
'searching and careful' judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the
agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable
manner."1 o
It is significant to note that the institutional objectives and
biases of administrative agencies are often inimical to environmental
goals." 7 Furthermore, the requirements of procedural due process
are often less stringent in an administrative than in a judicial arbi-
tration."8 It is in this light that Justice Marshall's concern for the
vitality of impartial judicial review of administrative determinations
made pursuant to NEPA acquires special force.
It has been held that "NEPA is an authoritative repudiation of
the notion that economy alone advances the public interest."' 19
NEPA does not "require particular substantive results in particular
problematic instances""' and does not "establish environmental pro-
tection as an exclusive goal";"' NEPA mandates, instead, "a reorder-
ing of priorities, so that environmental costs and benefits will
assume their proper place along with other considerations,"" 2 and,
105. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court called for "consideration of environ-
mental values 'to the fullest extent possible.'" Id. at 1128.
106. 100 S. Ct. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
107. For a judicial recognition of institutional bias in the administrative process of
making resource commitments, see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers of United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1972).
108. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Supreme Court reversed an appellate decision in
which the District of Columbia Circuit Court struck down an Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC) ruling. The Supreme Court overruled, as a matter of law, the appellate
court's holding that an AEC ruling could be overturned because citizens' groups had
been denied discovery and cross-examination by the AEC in a rule-making hearing.
109. Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 1006
(D.N.H. 1979).
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as some courts have argued, NEPA mandates also an integration of
environmental concerns into the decisional process."8 Because the
inherent complexity of resource determinations demands analytic
balancing and not merely the discharge of clerical, mechanical func-
tions;1 4 because NEPA requires agencies to consider and give effect
to environmental goals and not merely to file impact statements;"'
because the mandated consideration of environmental factors is a
superfluous exercise unless it directly bears on substantive agency
determinations,"' the view that NEPA is wholly procedural is
perhaps less problematic than baffling.
The Stryckers' Bay Court has erred, perhaps, in failing to com-
prehend the precise nature and complexity of resource determina-
tions. The Court's views appear insusceptible of reconciliation with
past judicial recognitions of Congressional intent to incorporate
environmental values into the decisional process " ' and with deci-
sions that have acknowledged the inherently substantive nature of
NEPA's mandate." 8  However, the paramount danger of the
Stryckers' Bay formulation does not emanate from judicial incon-
sistency. The decision's most threatening implications arise from its
apparent circumvention of the goals and processes critical to mini-
mizing the expansive and ecologically damaging impacts of a techno-
logical society.
NEPA was drafted, arguably, in response to the concerns of the
scientific community that Man is incrementally endangering the
complex continuum of biological interactions essential to the
regeneration of life." 9 That NEPA's lofty goals may be made concrete
113. E.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1005-06 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
114. Implicit in 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2)(B)'s recognition of the interrelationship of all
components of the natural and technological environment would appear to be a cor-
ollary recognition of the complex nature of the subject matter of environmental
analysis.
115. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States
Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972).
116. 449 F.2d at 1117-18.
117. See note 40, supra.
118. See text at notes 25, 35, and 45, supra.
119. As a people we have been overly optimistic, careless, and at times callous in
our exactions from the natural environment. The history of soil exhaustion and
erosion, of cut-over forest lands, of slaughtered wildlife document a few of our
early failures to maintain the restorative capacities of our natural resources. ...
But our exploding population and technology have created more subtle dangers,
less easily detected and more difficult to overcome.
These more recent dangers have been documented in testimony before the
Congress and in the reports of scientific committees. They confront us with the
possibility that the continuation of present trends affecting, for example, (a) the
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under the law has been implicitly recognized by the decisions
acknowledging that NEPA's mandated analysis of statutory consi-
derations may appropriately lead, in some instances, to the abandon-
ment or modification of federal proposals. NEPA's processes are
as sensitive to the problems and realities of the urban environment
as to the depletion of pristine resources.' This enactment created
"'action-forcing' procedures"'22 which were designed, not to be ends
in themselves,2 ' but a means to insure "that the policies and goals
defined in this act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions
of the Federal Government."'2 The Senate, recognizing that without
certain procedures, NEPA's "lofty declarations are nothing more
than that,"'2 created procedures to insure that "all federal agencies
do in fact exercise the substantive discretion given them."'26 But it
is the careful and reasoned substantive analysis of resource com-
mitments and environmental concerns itself that NEPA's redactors
intended to be the critical, analytic bridge between NEPA's pro-
cedures and substantive goals. NEPA's procedures, as some courts
chemistry of the air, (b) the contamination of food and water, (c) the use of open
land and living space, and (d) the psychophysical stress of crowding, noise and
interpersonal tension on urban populations, may infinitely degrade the existence
of civilized man before the end of this century. These are not the exaggerated
alarms or unsubstantiated predictions of extremists; they are sober warnings of
competent scientists supported by substantial demonstrable evidence .... In sum-
mary, within the present generation the pressures of man and technology have
exploded into the environment with unprecedented speed and unforeseen destruc-
tiveness.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 91ST CONG. 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT 4-5 (Comm. Print 1969). For a sophisticated analysis of
the biological, demographic, and technological dimensions of the global prospect, see D.
MEADOWS, D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. PEHRENS III, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1974). In
this scholarly exposition, a distinguished group of industrialists, scientists, civil
servants, humanists, economists, and educators from the international scientific com-
munity concluded that Man tends now, more than ever before, toward accelerated
growth and consumption, often "blindly assuming that his environment will permit
such expansion, that other groups will yield, or that science and technology will
remove the obstacles." Id. at 183. The global situation is such that "taking no action to
solve these problems is equivalent to taking strong action. Each day of exponential
growth brings the world system closer to [its] limits. A decision to do nothing is a deci-
sion to increase the risk of collapse." Id. at 185.
120. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States
Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1135 (5th Cir. 1974); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.
Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
121. Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972).
122. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969).
123. 470 F.2d at 297-98.
124. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969).
125. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969).
126. 449 F.2d at 1112.
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have suggested, were not intended to be the enactment's essence;"'
the duty of the courts and administrative agencies under NEPA was
arguably designed to be a substantive one: to insure, through careful
analysis, that "important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy" 28-to insure, in short, that NEPA's vital goals
do not remain unattained-and unattainable.
The Stryckers' Bay Court has constructed a model of statutory
compliance with NEPA that leaves these laudable goals as merely
empty aims; and the Court has deprived these aims of realization by
undermining the juridical definition of NEPA as a statutory direc-
tive which compels the substantive, analytic implementation of
NEPA's objectives. The remnants of this decision are emasculated
procedural, judicial, and administrative processes as well as a persis-
tent legal query: Are solely procedural processes sufficient to bridge
the gap between the aims of NEPA-and their reification?
John Milkovich
A FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE FOR COMPARING FAULTS:
A SUGGESTION FOR REEXAMINING "STRICT LIABILITY"
While working in a dimly lighted area on an offshore drilling rig
owned by the defendant, the plaintiff was injured when he fell
through a hole on one level to the floor of the next level. In
plaintiff's suit against Dixilyn seeking recovery in strict liability1
based on Louisiana Civil Code article 2317,2 the trial judge in-
structed the jury as to the requirements of strict liability and also
as to the availability of contributory negligence as a defense.3 A jury
127. Id.
128. 449 F.2d at 1111.
1. The plaintiff also brought an action in negligence. The jury found the defen-
dant negligent, but also found the plaintiff contributorily negligent, thus barring
recovery. While the negligence action is not at issue in this appellate opinion, it does
provide an example of when, if contributory negligence is not allowed as a defense in
the strict liability action, the plaintiff may avoid a denial of recovery by bringing the
action under strict liability.
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occa-
sioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we
are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. This, however, is to be
understood with the following modifications."
3. The instruction given to the jury provides in pertinent part: "'any negligence
on the part of the plaintiff which was a proximate cause of the accident bars the plain-
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